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A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE DEFERRED:
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE FSIA AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR HOLOCAUST ERA ART
RESTITUTION. REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA V.
ALTMANN, 124 S. CT. 2240 (2004).

Arjun Gupta*

I.

INTRODUCTION

More than half a century since the fall of the Third Reich, the
legacy of suffering and loss wrought by the Holocaust continues to plague
its victims. Although the lives and families shattered by Nazi aggression
can never be regained, family treasures and heirlooms — those repositories
of memory, love, and peace — are all that remain for many of the surviving
victims to recover. Their absence is a constant and painful reminder of the
violence and hate that ended six million lives and tragically changed
millions more. Works of art, Nazi war loot, comprise a large portion of
these objects of restitution. In such cases, the Diaspora implicates doctrines
of international law in many Holocaust era claims. Thus, perhaps most
problematic are the ways in which individuals and the diplomatic and legal
efforts of their nations confront the process of restitution. Works now in
state collections, many of which are considered part of a national cultural
heritage, form the basis for some of the most contentious cases. One such
example involves litigation arising from the restitution attempts of a
Viennese Jew, Maria Altmann, who fled the city with her family during the
Nazi annexation of Austria (Anschluss).1 Today, as an American citizen
and the sole surviving heir of her family, Altmann seeks the return of six
paintings by Gustav Klimt which she claims were expropriated in 1938 by
the Nazis from her family’s collection in violation of international law.2
The works, valued at over $150 million, are currently in the possession of
the Österreichische Galerie Belvedere (Vienna), an instrumentality of the
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Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240 (2004).
2
Id. at 2245.
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Austrian state.3
On June 7, 2004, the Supreme Court held that Maria Altmann could
sue the Republic of Austria for restitution under the expropriation exception
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA” or “the Act”).4
The Act is a codification of the “restrictive theory of sovereign immunity”
asserted in The Tate Letter providing limitations to the traditional doctrine
of absolute foreign sovereign immunity.5 The Act establishes that “a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States,” unless a suit is brought under one of the exceptions
enumerated in the Act.6 While there are cases holding the Act does not
apply retroactively to claims arising prior to the Tate Letter,7 the Act has
been applied to claims arising subsequent to the Tate Letter, but prior to
FSIA enactment.8 Thus, the Court’s holding in Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, sets the precedent that the Act applies to claims arising prior to
1952 and the introduction of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.9
In Altmann, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision,10 but on different grounds.11 At first glance, the narrow
holding appears to further a just cause for Maria Altmann and those with
similar claims; however, this note seeks to show that the reasoning behind
the opinion is flawed and confuses the issue of retroactive application of the
FSIA. In this context, the note asserts the holding’s implications for foreign
relations between the United States and foreign sovereigns are both
uncertain and daunting, making the decision ultimately detrimental to
claims of restitution of Nazi war loot (arising prior to enactment of the
FSIA). The Court’s opinion fails to take into full account the link between
the presumption against retroactivity and the theory of foreign sovereign
immunity. A likely consequence of the Court’s holding is that the
restitution of expropriated works may now be farther away than ever
before.

3

Hugh Eakin, Unfinished Business, Vol. 103, No. 7 ARTnews 152 (Summer, 2004).
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2240.
5
“[T]he immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii)
of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis).” Ltr. from Jack B. Tate, U.S. Dep of
State Acting Leg. Advisor, to Acting Atty. Gen. Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952) [hereinafter The Tate
Letter], reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 (1976).
6
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000).
7
See Carl Marks & Co., v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988); Jackson v.
People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986); Slade v. U.S. of Mexico, 617 F. Supp. 351
(D.D.C. 1985).
8
See Natl. City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); Schmidt v. Polish People’s
Republic, 579 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 742 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1984); Yessenin-Volpin v.
Novosti Press Agency, 433 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
9
124 S. Ct. 2240.
10
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Altmann II], amended by,
rehrg. denied, rehrg. en banc denied by Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003)
[hereinafter Altmann III].
11
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2247.
4
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Following an overview of the facts in Altmann, this Note will
provide background to the doctrine of Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the
FSIA. The subsequent analysis of the Court’s opinion will show that
concluding the FSIA applies retroactively is an erroneous holding
inconsistent with pertinent judicial history and in contradiction to the
relevant scheme of statutory interpretation and the Act’s purpose.
Subsequently, a brief account of the role of international treaties in
Holocaust era claims for reparations will show application of the Act is not
an appropriate solution to the problem in Altmann. The Note’s conclusion
asserts that the holding damages actions for restitution involving foreign
sovereigns and proposes an alternative approach to the exercise of
jurisdiction as a means to restitution.
II.

BACKGROUND

This background section begins with an account of the facts
concerning Maria Altmann’s claim for restitution followed by an outline of
the evolution of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States. The
development of the doctrine progresses from its beginnings in early
American jurisprudence to the emergence of the restrictive theory of
foreign sovereign immunity, enactment of the FSIA, and the courts’
retroactive application of the Act.
A.

The Facts of Republic of Austria v. Altmann

Maria V. Altmann is an American citizen who fled Vienna in 1938
during the Anschluss.12 Altmann immigrated to California in 1942 and
became a citizen of the United States in 1945.13 She is the niece and sole
heir of the Czech sugar magnate, Ferdinand Bloch who also fled Vienna
with his family during the Anschluss.14 Earlier, at the turn of the century,
Bloch had commissioned Gustav Klimt15 to paint his wife, Adele BlochBauer, and he owned a number of other works by the famous Art Nouveau
artist.16 His wife’s will, drafted prior to the Anschluss, requested that her
husband donate the works by Klimt (now valued at over $150 million)17 to
the Austrian National Gallery.18 The Nazis took possession of Bloch’s
estate when he fled the country during the war.19 When Bloch died in
12

Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2243.
Id.
14
Id.
15
Gustav Klimt (1862-1918) was the most important Austrian Art Nouveau (Jugendstil) painter and
founder of the Vienna Sezession (1898). Linda Murray & Peter Murray, Dictionary of Art and Artists
220 (7th ed., Penguin Books 1991).
16
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2243. Bloch-Bauer’s wife mentioned six Klimt paintings in her will: 1) Adele
Bloch-Bauer I, 2) Adele Bloch-Bauer II, 3) Apple Tree I, 4) Beechwood, 5) Houses in Unterach am
Attersee, and 6) Schloss Kammer am Attersee III (not at issue in Altmann because of Ferdinand BlochBauer’s prior gift of the painting to the Österreichische Galerie Belvedere (Vienna)). Id.
17
See Eakin, supra n. 3.
18
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2243-44.
19
Id. at 2244.
13
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Switzerland in 1945, he bequeathed title of the paintings to his heirs,
including Maria Altman.20 Dr. Erich Führer, the Nazi lawyer who helped
“aryanize” Bloch’s company and liquidate his estate, kept a number of
paintings.21 Claiming he was fulfilling the terms of Adele Bloch-Bauer’s
will, Führer donated two works to the Austrian National Museum.22
Subsequently, donation of the other works also followed, except one which
remained in the lawyer’s private collection.23
After the war, the Second Republic of Austria declared transactions
motivated by the Nazi party to be void.24 A series of negotiations between
the family and the City of Vienna, the Austrian Monument Agency, and the
Austrian National Gallery followed over the course of the next half century,
none of which resulted in the return of the works to their rightful heir(s).25
Attempts at return were revived after the decision in United States v.
Portrait of Wally, A Painting by Egon Schiele, where the Southern District
Court of New York upheld a subpoena allowing seizure of two works on
loan from the Austrian National Gallery at the Museum of Modern Art in
New York.26 In 1998, the same year the Portrait of Wally controversy
surfaced, an Austrian journalist found that “at all relevant times Gallery
officials knew that neither Adele nor Ferdinand, had in fact donated the six
Klimts to the Gallery.”27
Maria Altmann filed a claim in the Central District Court of
California for the return of the six Klimt paintings in the possession of the
Österreichische Galerie Belvedere (Vienna) claiming they had been
expropriated from her family by Nazis in violation of international law.28
The Republic of Austria moved to dismiss and the motion was denied.29
The district court held that the FSIA applied retroactively and that the Act’s
expropriation exception applied to Altmann’s claims.30 Austria appealed
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and remanded the district
court’s decision.31 A petition for rehearing was filed and denied by the

20

Id.
Id. The paintings were expropriated prior to 1941. Id.
22
Id. The two paintings, Adele Bloch-Bauer I and Apple Tree I, were traded for another Klimt painting,
Schloss Kammer am Attersee III. Id. at 2244 n. 2.
23
Id. at 2244.
24
Id. “This did not result in the immediate return of looted artwork to exiled Austrians, however,
because a different provision of Austrian law proscribed export of ‘artworks . . . deemed to be important
to [the country’s] cultural heritage.’” Id.
25
Id. at 2244-45.
26
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The paintings were eventually returned to Austria
when the New York Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision pursuant to New York’s antiseizure law protecting artwork from non-resident lenders from seizure. In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern Art, 719 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1999).
27
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2245.
28
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Altman I].
29
Id. at 1192.
30
Id.
31
Altmann II, 317 F.3d 954.
21
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Court of Appeals;32 subsequently certiorari was granted.33 On June 7, 2004,
in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held the FSIA applies to conduct
occurring prior to its enactment and prior to the United States’ adoption of
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.34
B.

The Evolution of Foreign Sovereign Immunity Doctrine

An established principal of international law,35 foreign sovereign
immunity has been applied by the United States as early as 1781 when the
Admiralty Court of Pennsylvania precluded exercise of jurisdiction over a
French warship.36 For over a century, the practice of foreign sovereign
immunity issued a grant of absolute protection to foreign sovereigns and
their agents from the jurisdictional reach of U.S. courts.37 Emerging
complexities in foreign relations during the twentieth century resulted in a
gradual shift away from this grant of total immunity,38 to a more restrictive
one ultimately codified in the FSIA of 1976.39
The classic theory of absolute sovereign immunity was first
articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Schooner Exchange v. McFadden.40
Marshall defined the principle of sovereign immunity as one in which
nations exempted each other from the jurisdiction of their national courts
and where the
[f]ull and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of
every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extra-territorial
power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their
sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no respect
amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the highest
character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing
himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another . .

32

Altmann III, 327 F.3d 1246.
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 540 U.S. 987 (2003).
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2254.
35
“The immunity of a state from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state is an undisputed principle
of customary international law.” Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States:
Introductory Note to Part IV(5)(A) (1987).
36
Moitez v. The South Carolina, Bee 422, 17 F. Cas. 574, No. 9,697 (Admiralty Court of Pa., 1781)
(holding that “mariners enlisting on board a ship of war, or vessel belonging to a sovereign independent
state, cannot libel against a ship for wages due”). See generally e.g. U.S. v. Peters, 3 U.S. 121 (1795)
(holding that a neutral ship captured by a French warship and held in a French port as a prize of war was
immune from suit).
37
Absolute immunity was adopted as a matter of policy despite the Constitutional provision allowing
jurisdictional exercise over foreign sovereigns: “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . .
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” U.S. Const. art. III, §
2 (emphasis added).
38
“Public opinion as to the peculiar rights and preferences due to the sovereign has changed.” Davis v.
Pringle, 268 U.S. 315, 318 (1925).
39
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2249.
40
11 U.S. 116, 146 (1812) (holding that a French warship sheltering in the Port of Philadelphia, though
allegedly an American merchant vessel seized on the high seas, was “to be considered as exempted by
the consent of that power from its jurisdiction”).
33
34
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..41
This notion of sovereign immunity was founded on the need for comity
between nations,42 the protection of the United States from foreign suits,43
and the difficulty experienced by U.S. courts attempting to enforce
judgments upon foreign sovereigns.44
Chief Justice Marshall decided Schooner Exchange according to
prevailing customs of international law (sovereign immunity)45 and
jurisdictional grounds (the relaxation of territorial jurisdiction).46 Although
granting absolute immunity, Justice Marshall qualified the theory stating
that a sovereign enjoys the privilege “in the confidence that the immunities
belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly
stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.”47
Moreover, Marshall’s opinion introduced the notion of deferment to the
executive branch of the federal government for “the suggestion of the
attorney for the United States,”48 an issue that complicates application of
sovereign immunity to this day. Thus, sovereign immunity represents an
implied license rather than a right. The notion of license informs
subsequent changes in foreign sovereign immunity doctrine through the
consideration of private and public conduct as influencing the exercise of
jurisdiction.49
As a result of the growing number of disputes between commercial
enterprises and foreign sovereigns, the early twentieth century saw a shift in
judicial policy towards the application of a “restrictive theory” of sovereign
immunity.50 In Berizzi Brothers v. The Pesaro, the Supreme Court
recognized that immunity is “applicable alike to all ships held and used by a

41

Id.
Id. at 136 (stating that “[t]he world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights
and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other, and by an
interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have
consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and
complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers”).
43
Id. at 146.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 136.
46
Id. at 146.
47
Id. at 137.
48
Id. at 147.
49
The distinction between the public and private acts of a foreign sovereign appears as early as 1822
when the Supreme Court held immunity may be withheld “[i]f . . . he comes personally within our
limits, although he generally enjoy a personal immunity, he may become liable to judicial process in the
same way, and under the same circumstances, as the public ships of the nation.” The Santissima
Trinidad and the St. An De, 20 U.S. 283, 353 (1822) (emphasis added).
50
See e.g. U.S. v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (holding that a
French agency operating mines in Europe and marketing their product in America was not immune from
suit because of their commercial activity and liability in French courts as a business entity despite being
an agent of the French government).
42
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government for a public purpose.”51 The distinction between the “public
purpose . . . of advancing the trade of its people, or providing revenue for
its treasury”52 and “private” conduct of a foreign sovereign became
increasingly influential in the application of the immunity principle.53
1.

The Restrictive Theory of Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the
Tate Letter

The limited application of immunity to agents of a foreign
sovereign engaged in commercial activity (private purpose), articulated by
the District Court in Pesaro I, involves factors of ownership, possession,
and use of the ship to determine the nature of its activity and its immunity
status.54 The State Department’s communiqué to Justice Mack in Pesaro I,
that such vessels “should not be regarded as entitled to the immunities
accorded public vessels of war,”55 represents a policy shift toward a
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity. From 1926 to 1938,
absolute immunity was applied by the Supreme Court without deference to
the State Department;56 however, during World War II, suggestions from
the executive branch again began to inform application of the doctrine.57
The formal adoption of the restrictive theory is expressed in a
recommendation by Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to Acting Attorney
General Philip B. Perlman (“Tate Letter”), dated May 19, 1952.58 A trend
toward the restrictive theory among a number of nations59 and sovereign
participation in commercial activities forms the basis for a policy asserting
“immunity should no longer be granted in certain types of cases”
(exceptions for private or commercial conduct).60 Although the Tate Letter
sets forth a definite policy supported by a clear rationale, judicial
application of the restrictive theory after 1952 is confused and marked by

51

271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) [hereinafter Pesaro III] (holding that immunity applied to a merchant vessel
owned and operated by the Italian government).
52
Id.
53
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (holding that a government owned vessel
from Mexico was subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts because it was operated by a private
company). “Since the vessel here, although owned by the Mexican Government, was not in its
possession and service, we have no occasion to consider the questions presented in the Berizzi case. It is
enough that we find no persuasive ground for allowing the immunity in this case, an important reason
being that the State Department has declined to recognize it.” Id. at 36 n. 1.
54
The Pesaro, 277 F. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) [hereinafter Pesaro I].
55
Id. at 480 n. 3.
56
Michael D. Murray, Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for Nazi War Crimes of
Plunder and Expropriation, 7 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Policy 223, 242 (2004).
57
As to application of the doctrine it is “not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government
has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to
recognize.” Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35. See e.g. Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-90 (1943).
58
Ltr. supra n. 5.
59
These nations consist of Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Greece, Netherlands, Peru, Romania,
Switzerland. 425 U.S. at 712.
60
Id. at 711. See also Ltr. supra n. 5.
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inconsistency.61 When the State Department was silent on an issue of
immunity, courts relied upon the standard set in the Tate Letter.62 Foreign
relations and diplomatic pressure resulted in the State Department’s
continued influence upon determinations of immunity in the courts.63 Thus,
the aim of the Tate Letter, to change the practice of Government “granting
immunity from suit to foreign governments made parties defendant in the
courts of the United States,” remained unresolved.64
A number of procedural problems persisted despite the adoption of
the Tate Letter and the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. Courts
continued to struggle with the problem of distinguishing between private
and public acts, often resorting to ad hoc tests for their determinations.65
The problem of securing in personam jurisdiction66 meant that actions
against foreign governments relied on in rem and quasi in rem proceedings
by attachment of the sovereign’s property within U.S. territory. Finally, in
cases where immunity was withheld and the exercise in jurisdiction resulted
in a verdict for the American plaintiff, execution of the judgment remained
improbable.67
2.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976

In response to difficulties courts encountered implementing the
restrictive theory of the Tate Letter, Congress passed the FSIA68 in an effort
to clarify application of the doctrine. The FSIA was intended to assure
“litigants that . . . decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under
procedures that insure due process.”69 The legislative history shows its
statutory purpose was also meant to relieve the burden of diplomatic

61

Altmann, 124 U.S. at 2248.
See generally e.g. Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354, 359-62 (2d Cir. 1964); Heany v. Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1971); Rovin Sales Co. v.
Romania, 403 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
63
See e.g. Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding immunity for a vessel following State
Department suggestion).
64
Ltr. supra n. 5.
65
Heany, 445 F.2d at 504 (considering the “nature test” where conduct previously considered within the
scope of government activity such as purchase of bullets for the military, to be a sovereign not a
commercial act). In Victory Transp., Inc., the court created another test based on five categories deduced
from the Tate Letter that would bestow immunity upon a sovereign: 1) internal administrative acts; 2)
legislative acts; 3) acts concerning the armed forces; 4) acts concerning diplomatic activity; 5) public
loans. 336 F.2d at 359-60.
66
“[B]efore the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act the federal courts were reluctant to apply the
doctrine of the ‘Tate Letter’ to permit the attachment of a foreign country's assets.” Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 4B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.3d § 1111 (West 2004). Thus, the “Tate Letter
[had] no effect on the customary rule that the property of a foreign sovereign is free from attachment.”
Id. (citing N.Y. & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (D.C.N.Y. 1955)).
67
Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959) (following the
State Department’s suggestion that a foreign government’s property “be immune from execution or
other action analogous to execution”).
68
28 U.S.C. § 1602 et. seq. (2000). The FSIA became effective on January 19, 1977, 90 days after
being passed from a bill into law, which was done on October 21, 1976. Id.
69
H.R. Rept. 94-1487 at 7 (Sept. 9, 1976).
62
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pressure from determining whether the State Department should grant or
deny immunity for every arising case.70 The Act’s main provisions
establish actions against foreign states,71 immunity of a foreign state,72
exceptions to jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state,73 foreign state
liability,74 a procedure for effecting service upon a foreign state,75 and
exceptions to the immunity from attachment or execution.76
In addition to providing the basis for in personam jurisdiction, the
FSIA establishes exclusive statutory authority to determine foreign
sovereign immunity.77 As a codification of the restrictive theory of foreign
sovereign immunity, the Act provides the following three exceptions to
immunity: 1) waiver of immunity by a foreign state; 2) actions arising out
of a foreign sovereign’s commercial activity; and 3) expropriation of
property in violation of international law.78 “If one of the specified
exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, a federal district court may
exercise subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a);” otherwise, federal
and state courts lack jurisdiction over the foreign state.79
3.

Retroactive Application of the FSIA

Although courts have held the FSIA applies to claims arising after
1952 and the Tate Letter’s directive on the restrictive theory of immunity,80
there has been considerable confusion as to whether the Act applies to
claims arising prior to 1952. The Supreme Court’s holding in Altmann
establishes that the FSIA and the expropriation exception apply to claims

70

Id. at 32 (leaving the courts to decide questions of immunity because “of the potential sensitivity of
actions against foreign states and the importance of developing a uniform body of law in this area”).
71
28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2000). Title 28, section 1330(a) provides for “original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state.”
72
Id. at § 1604.
73
Id. at § 1605.
74
Id. at § 1606.
75
Id. at § 1608.
76
Id. at § 1610.
77
Id. at § 1602. “The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of
foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice and
would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States courts. Under international
law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities
are concerned, and their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments
rendered against them in connection with their commercial activities. Claims of foreign states to
immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in conformity
with the principles set forth in this chapter.” Id.
78
Id. at § 1605. A “foreign state shall not be immune . . . in any case . . . (3) [1] in which rights in
property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged
for such property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state; or [2] that property or any property exchanged for such property is
owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or
instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.” Id. at 1603(d).
79
Verlinden B.V. v. C. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983).
80
See Natl. City Bank of N.Y., 348 U.S. 356; Schmidt, 579 F. Supp. at 23; Yessenin-Volpin, 443 F. Supp.
at 849. See also supra n. 8.
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arising prior to 1952.81 This decision overturns precedent asserting the Act
does not apply retroactively to claims arising prior to the Tate Letter.82
However, it extends the practice of applying the FSIA to claims arising
subsequent to the Tate Letter, but prior to the Act’s enactment. In Princz v.
Federal Republic of Germany, the court addressed the issue of FSIA
retroactive application to claims arising prior to 1952 and asserted, in dicta,
that the Act applies.83 The court held that no exception in the FSIA applied
to Princz’s claim for reparations against the German government. Thus, the
issue of retroactive application remained outside the scope of the decision.84
The Princz court suggested that, to overcome the presumption
against statutory retroactivity, Congressional intent was established by the
language “[c]laims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be
decided by courts of the United States and of the States . . . .”85 Along with
the passage of the FSIA, Congress also removed provisions for suits against
foreign governments from other statutes.86 In this context, “the implication
is strong that all questions of foreign sovereign immunity, including those
that involve an act . . . before 1976, are to be decided under the FSIA.”87
The Princz court followed the analysis of retroactive statutory
application in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, which established a twoprong test to determine whether a statute applied retroactively.88 In
Landgraf, to overcome the presumption against retroactivity, Congress
must express clear intent that the statute applies to events prior to its
enactment.89 Without such intent, the court resorts to a default rule in
deciding whether the statute has “retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would
impair [the] rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s
liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions
already completed.”90 Thus, if a statute is “substantive,” retroactive
application is improper. If it is “procedural,” then its application would not
result in any retroactive effect. Soon after, the Court applied the Landgraf
test to a case involving a statute creating jurisdiction where none previously
existed, holding that “[s]uch a statute, even though phrased in
‘jurisdictional’ terms, is as much subject to our presumption against

81

124 S. Ct. at 2240.
E.g. Carl Marks & Co., 841 F.2d at 26; Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1490; Slade, 617 F. Supp. at 351. See
also supra n. 7.
83
26 F.3d 1166, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Hugo Princz, the sole member of his family to survive Nazi
concentration camps was liberated by American soldiers while working at a chemical plant. Princz was
denied reparations because he was Slovak and had neither a German citizenship nor refugee status.
84
Id.
85
28 U.S.C. § 1602 (emphasis added).
86
Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170.
87
Id.
88
511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
89
“[T]he court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper
reach.” Id.
90
Id. (emphasis added).
82
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retroactivity as any other.”91 In Princz, the court noted that application of
the FSIA “to the pre-1952 events here in suit may not even count as a
‘genuinely “retroactive” effect,’”92 but did not find that it applied to events
occurring prior to 1952.
III.

ANALYSIS

This section begins with the assertion that under the Landgraf rule,
retroactive application of the FSIA would create an impermissible
retroactive effect. This assertion is supported by analysis showing the
Court’s conclusion that Landgraf is inapplicable, is erroneous, and that
there is no legislative intent for retroactive application. The following
examination of cases concerning retroactive FSIA application before and
after Landgraf shows that it is the proper standard for determinations of
statutory retroactivity. This section then argues that the Court’s application
of the FSIA in Altmann produces a retroactive effect because it creates a
forum where none existed before, and it upsets a foreign sovereign’s
expectations. The analysis ends with a brief discussion of International
treaties, government initiatives, and Holocaust era expropriation claims and
their implications for the decision in Altmann.
A.

Under the Landgraf Rule, Retroactive Application of the FSIA to
Claims Arising Prior to 1952 Results in an Impermissible
“Retroactive Effect”

The Court’s rationale for holding that the FSIA expropriation
exception could be applied retroactively to the claim in Altmann contradicts
established canons of statutory interpretation and judicial precedent. This
analysis of the Court’s opinion will show that the Landgraf rule is the
established and appropriate standard interpreting statutory retroactivity.
Under Landgraf, there is no clear legislative intent showing the FSIA
applies retroactively. Analysis of inconsistent decisions on the issue of
FSIA retroactive application will establish that the issue can only be
resolved under the Landgraf rule. The next section argues that, under
Landgraf, FSIA application in Altmann will result in an impermissible
retroactive effect. This result occurs because the FSIA can create a forum
where none exists and application of the Act in this case is unfair as it
disturbs the sovereign’s settled expectations. The final section asserts that,
given the implications of international treaties and government initiatives
concerning Holocaust era restitution claims, exercising the FSIA is not the
appropriate method to resolve the issue in Altmann.

91
92

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 951 (1997).
26 F.3d at 1170.
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The Court’s Reasoning that the Landgraf Default Rule does not
Apply is Erroneous

In an opinion rife with inconsistency, the Court’s interpretation of
the Landgraf analysis concludes that its articulation of the rule supporting a
presumption against retroactive application is inapplicable to the FSIA.93
The Court’s rationale is based upon its characterization of the FSIA as a sui
generis statute that cannot be categorized according to the Landgraf default
rule.94 Having summarily done away with any existing interpretive
guidelines with which to analyze the issue of retroactivity, the Court looks
to the structure and purpose of the FSIA to support its holding. This
exercise in statutory interpretation begins by seizing upon the first prong of
the Landgraf rule:95 that “retroactive effect” is to be determined in the
absence of legislative intent.96 Indeed, the subsequent rationale supporting
the retroactive application of the Act is entirely founded upon the Court’s
analysis of the statutory language and its search for legislative intent.97 This
section will show that with regard to the FSIA, there is no clear legislative
intent supporting retroactivity and that the Landgraf rule is the proper
standard to determine retroactivity in this case.
a.

There is No Clear Legislative Intent Showing the FSIA Applies
Retroactively

Following established canons of statutory interpretation, the
Supreme Court has established that “retroactivity is not favored in the law”
and that “congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be
construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result.”98 Although the Altmann Court cedes that there is no legislative
“express command”99 showing the Act was meant to apply retroactively,100
it nevertheless constructs its own finding of intent by implication. In its
interpretation of the Act as a kind of statutory palimpsest, the Court looks to
the language of the preamble and the “overall structure” of the Act as
grounds justifying retroactive application.101
The Court focuses on the word “henceforth” in the preamble of the
Act asserting that while the section is not an “express command” of
93

Altmann, 124 S.Ct. at 2251.
Id. at 2252.
95
Id.
96
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. See supra pt. II(B)(3) (discussing retroactive application of the FSIA).
97
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2252-54.
98
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 264 (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown U. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)).
Justice Scalia states that “the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our
jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.” Id. at 265. “It is a
principle of the English common law, as ancient as the law itself, that a statute, even of its omnipotent
parliament, is not to have a retrospective effect.” Id. at 266 n. 17.
99
Id. at 280.
100
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2252.
101
Id. at 2253.
94
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retroactivity, the “language is unambiguous.”102 The preamble of the FSIA
states:
Congress finds that the determination by United States courts
of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the
jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice
and would protect the rights of both foreign states and
litigants in United States courts. Under international law,
states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts
insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their
commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction
of judgments rendered against them in connection with their
commercial activities. Claims of foreign states to immunity
should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States
and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in
this [statute].103
In this context, the preamble directive means only that the Act’s
codification of the restrictive theory of immunity will replace prior
practice concerning sovereign immunity (marked by Executive
intervention). The language in the preamble is unambiguous in that
it refers to a new practice of judicial and statutory determination of
sovereign immunity. There is no reference to retroactivity, but the
preamble simply establishes the new function and purpose of the
Act.
In Landgraf, the Court considered whether § 102 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 allowing monetary relief for some forms of
workplace discrimination be applied to cases pending during its
enactment.104 Applying its default rule to determine retroactive
effect, the Court held that § 102 did not apply to pending cases in the
absence of congressional intent.105 The Court considered the
legislative history of the bill, including an earlier version’s language
explicitly asserting retroactive application that was vetoed by the
President, in part, because of its “unfair retroactivity rules.”106 The
congressional record concerning the discussion surrounding the 1991
Act cites qualifications from several senators that the Act not be
applied retroactively. The Court in Altmann makes no mention of
any language, apart from its reliance on the word “henceforth” in the
preamble (which it admits does not express intent), or of any

102

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1602 (emphasis added).
104
511 U.S. at 254 (holding that § 102 expands upon the remedies available in the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII)).
105
Id. at 286.
106
Id. at 255-56.
103
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indication that Congress intended the Act to apply retroactively. As
this Court has unequivocally stated in Landgraf, the clear statement
standard for retroactive application of statutes cannot be met absent
any express command in the statutory language or in the legislative
history.107
Failing the clear statement standard, the Court substitutes its
own constructional method of finding intent by turning to the
“overall structure” of the Act.108 Intent resides in the application of
certain provisions which the Court cites as having been applied to
claims arising out of conduct prior to its enactment.109 In Dole Food
Co. v. Patrickson, the Court held that a private corporation could not
assert sovereign immunity (pursuant to the FSIA) in a claim arising
from conduct when the entity was owned by a foreign sovereign.110
In Altmann, the Court suggests the Dole holding, that status of a
foreign instrumentality is determined at the time of filing suit and not
when the conduct occurred, is representative of the Act’s retroactive
application.111 The Dole holding is not concerned with the
retroactive application of the statute; rather, it defines status as a
basis for jurisdiction in the statute. As such, the presumption against
retroactivity still applies and would not be abandoned simply
because determination of jurisdiction involved the status of an entity.
The Altmann Court also presents a case involving a dispute over a
contract whose formation predates the FSIA as evidence supporting
retroactive application of the Act’s provisions.112 In Verlinden, decided
over a decade before Landgraf and its rule on the retroactive application of
statutes, there was no discussion of retroactivity with regard to the FSIA’s
application concerning suit over the contract. The Verlinden Court
considered a constitutional challenge to the foreign plaintiff’s right to bring
suit under the FSIA but did not hold on whether the facts of the case
(turning on the contract) fell within the FSIA’s scope of exceptions
allowing suit. The issue concerned a party’s status and foreign sovereign
immunity as involving “application of substantive federal law . . . within the
meaning of Art. III.”113 As such, the Court’s holding addressed a question
of common-law interpretation stating “on remand, the Court of Appeals

107

Id. at 254. “[A] court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the
statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default
rules.” Id. at 244.
108
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2253.
109
Id.
110
538 U.S. 468, 480 (2003).
111
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2253.
112
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 482, 498 (holding a claim by a foreign plaintiff under the FSIA in U.S. district
court is not a violation of Article III of the Constitution).
113
Id. at 497.
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must consider whether jurisdiction exists under the Act itself.”114
Neither Dole nor Verlinden are comparable to the determination of
FSIA retroactivity in Altmann. The Court’s silence on the issue in
Verlinden is not implicit acquiescence in support of retroactive application.
In Dole, retroactive application is not at issue. Instead, the status of the
parties is resolved so their suit may be considered within the scope of the
FSIA. The Court’s finding of implicit intent in the “overall structure”115 of
the Act is an admitted deviation from the standard determination of intent
articulated under the Landgraf rule. The Court’s justification for its own
substitution of statutory interpretation is less argued than it is simply
asserted in its statement that the FSIA exists sui generis. In this, the Court
contradicts its own reasoning by positing two anomalous holdings that do
not directly address retroactive application of the FSIA, while ignoring a
majority of appellate court holdings that deny it. After the Landgraf
decision, most district and appellate courts directly confronting the issue of
FSIA retroactivity to events before 1952116 rely upon the Landgraf analysis.
In this context, the FSIA is hardly unique or incompatible with analysis
under the Landgraf rule.
b.

Inconsistent Decisions on the Issue of FSIA Retroactive
Application Before and After Landgraf

As mentioned earlier, some courts have held the FSIA applies to
acts prior to its enactment regarding claims based on conduct after the Tate
Letter and the adoption of the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity.117 Courts remain divided on this question, and this inconsistency
is further complicated by the dates of their decisions with respect to the
Landgraf holding. Prior to Landgraf, several district courts held that the
FSIA applies retroactively while others deny such application to events
occurring before 1952.118 Thus, with regard to the Act, “two degrees of
retroactivity are at issue . . . that the FSIA can apply to claims arising before
its effective date, so long as those claims did not arise before the
publication of the Tate Latter in 1952.”119 After Landgraf, although
inconsistencies in the determination of retroactive application and the use of
Landgraf remain, the default rule is the critical standard.
Prior to Landgraf, the Second Circuit upheld a district court
decision and its rationale denying retroactive application of the FSIA to

114

Id. at 498.
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2253.
Ltr., supra n. 5.
117
See supra pt. II(B)(3) (discussing retroactive Application of the FSIA).
118
See supra n. 7.
119
Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 665 F.Supp. 323, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
[hereinafter Carl Marks I].
115
116
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events occurring before 1952.120 In its reasoning, the Southern District
Court of New York mentioned three cases concerning the FSIA and its
application to events occurring before 1952.121 In Schmidt, which allowed a
claim against Poland for default on notes it issued prior to 1952, the court
did not address the issue of retroactivity.122 In Von Dardel, the court
allowed a claim concerning the seizure, detention, and possible murder of
the famous Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg by Soviet occupation
forces in 1945 Hungary.123 FSIA application in Von Dardel turned on
Wallenberg’s status as alive or dead, and the Carl Marks I court stated:
[Because of this fact,] under applicable statutes of limitation
their [Plaintiffs’] claims have not yet accrued. Thus,
whatever the circumstances, the Von Dardel plaintiffs have
viable post-1952–indeed, post-1977–claims, so that Von
Dardel does not involve retrospective application of the
FSIA.124
In Asociacian de Reclamantes, the court allowed FSIA application to land
claims arising at the end of the Mexican-American War in 1848.125 The
Carl Marks I court noted that suit for compensation in Reclamantes
represented a post-1952 claim because “Mexico had consistently
acknowledged its obligation to pay plaintiffs' claims” even after the suit had
been filed in 1981.126 Thus, the facts in the three aforementioned cases all
involved foreign sovereign continuing obligations that arose before 1952,
but were ongoing and unresolved after 1952. In this context, FSIA
retroactive application was not a dispositive issue in these cases.
After Landgraf, some courts have followed the dicta in Princz,
asserting the Act applies to events prior to 1952.127 In Creighton Ltd. v.
Government of Qatar, the court held the arbitration provision in the FSIA,
part of a 1988 amendment to the Act, applied retroactively to events
predating the amendment.128 In Haven v. Republic of Poland, the court
found the FSIA applied retroactively to a claim arising out of the seizure
and “nationalization” of Plaintiff’s property by Poland at the end of World

120

Carl Marks & Co., 841 F.2d at 27. “In sum, we agree with the District Court that the FSIA does not
apply to confer jurisdiction over the instant actions for substantially the reasons set forth in Chief Judge
Brieant’s comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion.” Id. at 27-28.
121
Carl Marks I, 665 F. Supp. at 348 (distinguishing Schmidt, 579 F. Supp. 23; Von Dardel v. Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985), and Asociacian de Reclamantes v. United
Mexican States, 561 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
122
579 F. Supp. 23.
123
623 F. Supp. 246.
124
Carl Marks I, 665 F. Supp. at 349.
125
561 F. Supp. 1190.
126
Carl Marks I, 665 F. Supp. at 349.
127
28 U.S.C. § 1602; Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170.
128
181 F.3d 118, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that if one provision applied retroactively then, by
implication, the entire Act applied retroactively).
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War II.129 Although the courts in both cases found the Act applied
retroactively, neither decision applied the Landgraf test properly, basing
their decisions instead on the jurisdiction-allocating language in Landgraf.
The court in Haven relied on the reasoning in Princz because it articulated a
post-Landgraf position concerning jurisdictional statutes;130 however,
neither Haven nor Creighton took into account the qualification in Hughes
Aircraft Co. on retroactivity regarding statutes that create jurisdiction where
none existed before.131
The Eastern District Court of New York held that the FSIA could
not be applied retroactively to events occurring prior to 1952 in two cases
which were subsequently remanded by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. In Abrams v. Societe Nationale Des Chemins De Fer Francais the
court denied retroactive application of the FSIA for claims against a French
governmental corporate agency during World War II.132 Subsequently, in
Garb v. Republic of Poland, the court held that the Landgraf decision did
not overrule “the Second Circuit’s ruling in Carl Marks that a foreign
state’s settled expectation of immunity from the jurisdiction of the United
States courts ‘rises to the level of an antecedent right.’”133 In other words,
“Carl Marks makes [it] clear that it [FSIA] cannot be applied
retroactively.”134 The Second Circuit remanded both rulings determining
that application of the second prong of Landgraf was necessary to establish
“whether plaintiffs could have legitimately expected to have their claims
adjudicated in the United States prior to the FSIA’s enactment.”135 Thus,
under the Landgraf test, retroactive effect “should be informed and guided
by ‘familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled
expectations.’”136
Analysis of rationale resolving questions of FSIA retroactive
application after Landgraf presents two bases concerning the Act’s
application: 1) The FSIA is a jurisdictional statute (as treated in Haven, but
also one that affects substantive rights pursuant to the Hughes analysis);
and 2) Retroactive effect involves consideration of a foreign sovereign’s
“settled expectations,” (as in Abrams II and Garb II). It is in this context
involving the Landgraf analysis that the Court in Altmann should have
considered the issue of FSIA retroactivity. Consideration of the FSIA’s two
issues raised by the Landgraf rule concerning the Act’s operation as a

129

68 F. Supp. 2d 943, 945-46 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aff’d, Haven v. Republic of Poland, 215 F.3d 727 (7th
Cir. 2000).
130
Id. at 946.
131
Hughes Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. at 951.
132
175 F. Supp. 2d 423, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) [hereinafter Abrams I].
133
207 F. Supp. 2d 16, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Garb I].
134
Id. at 27.
135
Abrams v. Societe Nationale Des Chemins De Fer Francais, 332 F.3d 173, 186 (2d Cir. 2003)
[hereinafter Abrams II].
136
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001) (quoting Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 358 (1999)).
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jurisdictional statute and a foreign sovereign’s antecedent rights not only
follow an established standard (however inconsistent), it represents the only
standard. To abandon the Landgraf analysis in determinations of FSIA
retroactivity is to depart from stare decisis suddenly and with no showing
of good cause.
c.

The Landgraf Rule is the Proper Standard for Determining
Statutory Retroactivity

The Supreme Court’s approach to the question of statutory
retroactivity in Landgraf is the clearest and most appropriate standard for
analysis of the FSIA’s reach. In Landgraf, the Court considered whether
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and its new provisions for jury trials, and
punitive and compensatory relief in sexual harassment claims, should apply
to a pending case.137 In the absence of legislative intent or an express
command in the statutory language, the Court looked to the canons of
statutory interpretation concerning retroactive application.138 The Court
stated that it must “apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
decision,”139 and that “retroactivity is not favored in the law.”140 In light of
these two principles of construction, the Court determined the question of
statutory retroactivity as “whether the new provision attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment.”141
In applying the test for retroactive effect (outlined in the
Background section142), the Landgraf Court asserted a “new jurisdictional
rule usually ‘takes away no substantive right but simply changes the
tribunal that is to hear the case.’”143 As the Altmann Court notes, pursuant
to its decision in Verlinden, the FSIA codifies “the standards governing
foreign sovereign immunity as an aspect of substantive federal law.”144 The
Court also mentions its clarification of the Landgraf rule regarding
jurisdictional statutes in Hughes, stating statutes that create jurisdiction
where none exist “spea[k] not just to the power of a particular court but to
the substantive rights of the parties as well.”145
In its attempt to show that Hughes is inapplicable, the Court
distinguishes the Hughes statute because the retroactive jurisdictional
amendment in question “attached to the statute that created the cause of

137

511 U.S. at 249-50.
Id. at 259-63.
Id. at 264 (quoting Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)).
140
Id. at 264 (quoting Bowen, 488 U.S. 208. The Court’s assertion of a presumption against retroactivity
included Constitutional clauses such as the Ex Post Facto Clause, Due Process in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments (regarding fair notice), and the prohibition on bills of attainder). Id. at 266.
141
Id. at 270.
142
See supra pt. II(B)(3) (discussing retroactive application of the FSIA).
143
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274 (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916)).
144
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2251 (quoting Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 496-97) (emphasis in original).
145
Id. (quoting Hughes, 520 U.S. at 951).
138
139
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action,” unlike the FSIA where no such limitation exists.146 As Justice
Kennedy notes in his dissent, “[w]hat is of concern in the retroactivity
analysis that Hughes Aircraft sets out, however, is the internal integrity of
American statutes, not of whether an American law allows suit where
before none was allowed elsewhere in the world.”147 In other words, the
cause of action in Altmann based on the FSIA expropriation exception does
not trump the presumption against retroactive application of the Act. The
issue is not what type of claims can be brought, but whether there is
jurisdiction over the claim when it arose.
In Altmann, the expropriation claim arose out of events occurring
when U.S. courts did not have jurisdiction because they occurred prior to
the adoption of restrictive immunity. Thus, while it is clear that the FSIA
governs such claims, it does not necessarily follow that the Act applies
retroactively.148 Therefore, the question is whether application of the FSIA
in Altmann would change the substantive rights and legal obligations of the
parties. This question can only be answered by applying the Landgraf
analysis in the absence of any other standard of statutory interpretation
addressing this issue.
2.

The Court’s Application of the FSIA in Altmann Would Produce a
“Retroactive Effect”

The Altmann Court claims that none of the three examples of
“retroactive effect”149 apply to the “FSIA’s clarification of the law of
sovereign immunity,” but it does not fully consider the potential
“effects.”150 Here, the dissent is especially helpful in pointing out that the
Court overlooks the question of whether the Act confers jurisdiction “where
before there was none”151 (pursuant to Hughes). Thus, the first inquiry of
analysis into retroactive effect involves a determination of the Act’s
jurisdictional nature. The next question is whether or not the FSIA creates
a new forum if applied retroactively. Finally, as mentioned prior, the
presumption against retroactivity arises out of a concern for “unfair surprise
and upsetting expectations.”152 In stating that the FSIA’s purpose is not to
146

Id.
Id. at 2272.
148
Id.
149
See supra nn. 86-88. “Whether it would impair [the] rights a party possessed when he acted, increase
a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already
completed.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.
150
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2251. The court seems to require that the Landgraf rule “definitively” resolve
the issue. Id. Justice Kennedy’s dissent ends quoting Hughes, stating that the Landgraf rule “does not
purport to define the outer limit of impermissible retroactivity. Rather our opinion in Landgraf . . .
merely described that any such effect constituted a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition for
invoking the presumption against retroactivity.” Id. at 2276 (quoting Hughes, 520 U.S. at 947)
(emphasis in original).
151
Id. at 2267.
152
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 282-83. See Garb I, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 27; supra pt. III(A)(1)(b) (discussing
inconsistent decisions on the issue of FSIA retroactive application before and after Landgraf).
147
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allow “foreign states and their instrumentalities to shape their conduct in
reliance on the promise of future immunity,”153 the Court suggests the
notion of reliance on immunity from U.S. courts is not a part of a foreign
state’s conduct. Yet this notion of reliance forms the very basis of the
sovereign immunity doctrine in that it seeks to preclude judgment of one
sovereign against another’s public acts. Thus, the final issue is whether or
not a diminished reliance interest is sufficient to rebut the presumption
against retroactivity.154
a.

The FSIA Can Create a Forum Where None Exists

In Hughes, the Supreme Court clearly held that when a statute
“creates jurisdiction where none previously existed[,] it thus speaks not just
to the power of a particular court but to the substantive rights of the parties
as well.”155 This view summarizes the Court’s holding fourteen years
earlier in Verlinden where, pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, “a
suit against a foreign state under this Act [FSIA] necessarily raises
questions of substantive federal law . . . and hence clearly ‘arises under’
federal law.”156 In raising “sensitive issues concerning the foreign relations
of the United States” where the “primacy of federal concerns is evident,”
application of the FSIA involves substantive federal law.157 Thus,
according to Verlinden, although determining jurisdictional exercise, the
FSIA is inherently a substantive statute.
In Verlinden, the Court concluded that application of the FSIA to a
contract dispute between a Dutch corporation and the Central Bank of
Nigeria represented the exercise of congressional authority over foreign
commerce.158 In this context, “the jurisdictional provisions of the Act are
simply one part of this comprehensive scheme [governing sovereign
immunity].”159 The substantive portions of the Act, those creating
exceptions to sovereign immunity, would create a new jurisdictional forum
pursuant to the qualification in Hughes.
A new forum is created by the Act’s application in Altmann
because the expropriation exception is a clarification of sovereign immunity
law that did not exist prior to enactment of the FSIA. In his dissent, Justice
Kennedy reiterates the statement of the amicus curiae, submitted by the
U.S. State Department, that “the Tate Letter rules contain no principle that
parallels § 1605(a)(3), the FSIA’s expropriation exception.”160 Prior to

153

Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2252.
Id. at 2271.
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520 U.S. at 951.
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461 U.S. at 493.
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Id.
158
Id. at 496.
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Id.
160
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2269 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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enactment of the FSIA, “nationalization” was considered conduct the State
Department “recognized and allowed” as “one of the categories of strictly
political or public acts” defined by the Tate Letter’s doctrine of restrictive
immunity.161 Although the expropriation in Altmann is clearly less an
example of nationalization, it is also not an exception to immunity
mentioned in the Tate Letter.162 As the expropriation exception falls
outside the scope of restrictive immunity prior to FSIA enactment, to apply
the Act in resolving an expropriation claim arising out of events occurring
between 1938 and 1941163 would create a new forum.
In Jackson, the court denied a claim against the Chinese
government holding that,
[F]rom 1911 to the date of maturity of the bonds in 1951
China relied on the expectation that the extant and almost
universal doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity
governed relations between China and the United States
and between the citizens of the two countries.164
In Carl Marks I, the district court researched cases involving the
Russian Government(s) between 1927 and 1952 and found that “before
1952 the United States courts would have treated the Russian Governments
as entitled to absolute sovereign immunity” with regard to the claims in that
case.165 If throughout the post-world war era and well into the cold war
Russia could expect immunity prior to introduction of the Tate Letter, then
it follows that Austria could expect the same up until 1952.
The legislative history behind the FSIA supports the notion that
none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity apply to events occurring
prior to 1952 because the Act was intended as the “codification of
restrictive theory” introduced in the Tate Letter.166 As a codification of
principles, the Act applies to claims arising out of events occurring when
those principles were in effect (i.e., after the Tate Letter’s introduction of
the principles in 1952). The State Department’s adoption of the Tate Letter
and its guidelines for restrictive immunity represents the creation of a new
forum allowing suits against a foreign sovereign’s state or commercial
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Victory Transp. Inc., 336 F. 2d at 360. “Such acts are generally limited to the following categories:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien. (2) legislative acts, such as
nationalization. (3) acts concerning the armed forces. (4) acts concerning diplomatic activity. (5) public
loans.” Id.
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Ltr., supra n. 5.
163
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2244. The period following the Anschluss when Bloch’s estate was
“aryanized” and his artwork was expropriated. See supra n. 21.
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Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1497.
165
665 F. Supp. at 339. Russian courts expected absolute immunity “except insofar as those
Governments could have been considered to have waived their immunity or consented to setoffs by
appearing as plaintiffs or the assignors of plaintiffs in the United States courts.” Id. at 339-40.
166
H.R. Rpt. 94-1487 at 7.
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conduct.167 Application of FSIA exceptions “to pre-1952 transactions and
events would affect foreign sovereigns' antecedent rights adversely”
because it would create a forum where none existed.168 Consequently,
application of the Act to pre-1952 events results in a “retroactive effect”
pursuant to Landgraf.
b.

Retroactive Application
Expectations”

of

the

FSIA

Disturbs

“Settled

In his dissent, Justice Kennedy asserts that whether Austria could
have expected to receive immunity at the time the expropriation occurred
remains unresolved.169 The Court of Appeals incorrectly analyzed this
“unmanageable” question by wrongly assuming “responsibility for the
political question, rather than confining its judgment to the legal one.”170 In
its legal context, immunity under the pre-FSIA regime existed and the only
executive statement that “displaces the immunity presumption to some
degree” is the Tate Letter.171 Jurisdiction over claims involving a foreign
sovereign’s commercial or private acts are allowed under the Tate Letter.
As this analysis has shown above, “[i]f petitioners' conduct would not be
subject to suit under the Tate Letter principles, the FSIA cannot alter that
result without imposing retroactive effect.”172
Prior to Landgraf, decisions such as Carl Marks and Jackson found
that, if applied retroactively, the FSIA would disturb a foreign state’s
“settled expectation, rising ‘to the level of an antecedent right,’ of immunity
from suit in American courts.”173 A foreign sovereign’s settled expectation
was the basis denying retroactive application of the FSIA in Amoco
Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne174 and Hwang Geum
Joo v. Japan.175 The Joo court looked beyond Landgraf to the 1951 Treaty
of Peace with Japan that “manifests the parties’ intent to resolve matters
arising from World War II without involving the courts of the United
States,” but are “to be resolved through intergovernmental settlements.”176
Yet the claims of sexual slavery in Joo do not fit comfortably within any
FSIA exceptions, and the D.C. District Court stated, “even if Japan did not
enjoy sovereign immunity, this case must be dismissed because it is
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Carl Marks I., 665 F. Supp. at 339.
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2269 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
170
Id.
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Carl Marks, 841 F.2d at 27.
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605 F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1979).
175
332 F.3d 679, 684-85 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (denying application of the FSIA commercial activity
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nonjusticiable.”177
The court in Joo asserts that the 1951 Treaty represents Japan’s
settled expectation of immunity from suits concerning World War II
conduct.178 In this context, the holding in Joo represents an exception to
rationales relying on the Landgraf analysis and interpretations of the FSIA
as a jurisdiction-allocating, and therefore procedural statute.179 Earlier
courts prior to Landgraf, such as Pesaro (III),180 also viewed foreign
sovereign immunity as more than merely a matter of jurisdiction allocation.
Joo addresses the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Altmann,181 distinguishing it
on the grounds that the 1951 Treaty did not include Germany (or Austria)
as a signatory,182 and a State Department directive concerning Nazi
expropriation dealt with the matter as a legal issue and not one of
international treaties.183 The absence of a treaty on the subject of restitution
of Holocaust loot is not dispositive on the issue of a sovereign’s
expectations and it does not displace the governing principles of the Tate
Letter in a pre-FSIA regime.
The question of Austria’s expectations during the years after the
close of World War II is not addressed by the Altmann Court. From 1945
to the signing of the State Treaty of 1955, Austria was occupied by the
allied forces184 and its heartland was under the de facto control of the Soviet
Union.185 Whether Austria could expect immunity from U.S. courts, when
its very occupation was, to a great extent, based on demands for restitution
by the Soviet Union and the other allies, is of relevance to the analysis of
retroactive effect. Nevertheless, geopolitical considerations aside, the legal
protocol for exceptions to sovereign immunity regarding an expropriation
claim simply did not exist at that time. In this context, the Court’s
retroactive application of the Act to a pre-FSIA regime of sovereign
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immunity constitutes unfair surprise.
The Altmann Court’s assertion that the FSIA’s purpose is distinct
from a sovereign’s expectations186 is blatantly at odds with the doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity and its preservation of comity. The importance
of “grace and comity”187 is especially relevant to considerations of future
reliance on immunity. The reliance interests of a foreign sovereign has
formed, and continues to form, the basis for international treaties, executive
agreements, and legislative action involving claims arising from pre-FSIA
events.
B.

Implications of International Treaties,188 Government Initiatives,
and Holocaust Era Expropriation Claims in Altmann

Postwar treaties dating from 1945, such as the Potsdam Agreement
and the Paris Agreement, dealt with reparations for claims against both the
German government and private entities.189 The Paris Agreement, while
addressing some reparations issues, “reserved the final settlement for an
eventual [multilateral] peace treaty.”190 The Transition Agreement of 1954
constitutes the final resolution for reparations related claims,191 stating that
“the problem of reparations shall be settled by the peace treaty between
Germany and its former enemies or by earlier agreements concerning the
matter.”192
Reviewing the relevant treaties and cases concerning
reparations actions, the court in In re Nazi Era Cases noted that “claims for
war reparations arising out of World War II have always been managed on
a governmental level, beginning with the Potsdam Agreement.”193
Of the three international treaties passed after World War II
specifically addressing the problem of war loot, two cover cultural property
of national importance,194 and only one addresses claims brought by private
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Econ. L. 383, 387 (2000).
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individuals (within fifty years from the time of expropriation).195 None of
the international treaties successfully presents a solution to the problems of
restitution, reparations, and compensation for Holocaust survivors and their
heirs.196 The 1998 Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets sought
to resolve some of the issues surrounding Holocaust-era claims including
those concerning looted art.197 Although a consensus was reached
establishing eleven principles to help resolve claims concerning Nazi loot,
because the results of the conference were not legally binding, little
progress has been made in returning stolen works to their rightful
owners.198 Efforts by the American Association of Museum Directors
(“AAMD”) have provided guidelines for resolving art restitution claims as
well as ethical principles for museum acquisitions and returns.199 Because
AAMD’s suggestions have not been adopted internationally and are not
legally binding, they have had mixed results.200
In the late 1990s, Congress attempted to fill the void in legal
resolutions addressing claims for restitution involving Nazi war loot.
Congress has established government funded research aimed at furthering
successful restitution of works to their rightful owners (Holocaust Victims
Redress Act).201 The U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998
creates an independent presidential commission to “examine the role of the
United States in the collection and disposition of Holocaust-era assets.”202
In 2000, a cooperative effort between the U.S. and Germany resulted in the
creation of the German Foundation to resolve claims of Holocaust
survivors; however, no compensation has yet been paid.203
In January of 2001, a General Settlement Fund agreement was
signed by the State Department and Austria in an attempt to resolve
litigation arising from Holocaust era claims.204 Under the General
Settlement Fund provisions, Austria has allocated approximately $210
million for compensation and restitution purposes.205 Thus, the General
Settlement Fund, following a pattern of attempts at resolving the problem of
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Nazi expropriation, represents a diplomatic attempt at a solution. The fund
developed in response to increased litigation over Holocaust era claims
after the reunification of Germany in 1990 when a number of suits were
filed to recover Nazi gold held in Swiss banks.206 The State Department
has maintained its insistence on diplomatic efforts as a means of resolving
Holocaust era claims.207
Prior treaties aside, the German Foundation (“Foundation”) of 2000
represents an important executive agreement aimed at resolving Holocaust
era restitution claims.208 The court in In re Nazi Era Cases relied upon
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Stuart E. Eizenstat’s declaration regarding
the establishment of the Foundation to define the State Department’s
purpose regarding such claims.209 The court quotes Eizenstat’s position that
claims, “including but not limited to . . . slave and/or forced labor,
aryanization, medical experimentation . . . damage to or loss of property[,] .
. . should be pursued through the Foundation instead of the courts.”210 In
the context of In re Nazi Era Cases, the State Department “argues for
dismissal on any valid legal ground.”211 “Aryanization” is the basis of
Maria Altmann’s complaint claiming wrongful expropriation of the Klimt
paintings.212 Here, the valid legal ground for dismissal is that application of
the FSIA would result in an impermissible retroactive effect. Given the
Court in Altmann admits its holding does nothing to interfere with State
Department statements of interest regarding the exercise of jurisdiction in
such cases,213 it is clear that resolution of such claims be settled out of
court.
The Altmann Court is ambivalent in light of executive agreements
and State Department guidance including the amicus curae submitted by
the government in Altmann stating, “[w]hile the United States' views on
such an issue are of considerable interest to the Court, they merit no special
deference.”214 Considering the Court’s own recognition that the Act’s
purpose is to limit executive influence, its ambivalence on the issue is
especially problematic. As there is no distinction between private and
public acts in the FSIA, allowing executive intervention where it was
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previously limited to private acts under the Tate Letter invites further
confusion.
The court in In re Nazi Era Cases finds the government’s
recommendation for dismissal of such claims persuasive because it “is
motivated by the twin concerns of justice and urgency,” due to “prolonged
and uncertain litigation . . . and compensation to aged victims in their
lifetimes.”215 This rationale, coupled with the fact that a foreign sovereign
could expect the question of immunity concerning litigation over pre-1952
events be determined by the U.S. State Department, has important
diplomatic implications. The potential for incurring retribution in foreign
policy for judicial determinations of the sort in Altmann is a very real
possibility. Hence, it would seem appropriate that claims of expropriation
and the restitution of art (especially art currently considered part of a
nation’s cultural heritage or patrimony) continue to be resolved through
diplomatic efforts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Today, it appears the Court’s decision in Altmann is less grounded
upon legal principles than it is on a sense of moral justice. The question is
not whether Maria Altmann should have her day in court; rather it is
whether justice is best served for her and for other victims through litigation
in American courts. In its effort to achieve a noble end, the Court
summarily dismisses established canons and precedent while also ignoring
the implications its holding might have for American foreign relations.
This result is particularly troubling given the United States’ current position
as the sole superpower and as an increasingly unilateral actor on the world’s
stage. Although a case by case approach to the issue of FSIA retroactivity
in Holocaust era expropriation claims remains problematic, the Landgraf
rule is a critical factor in such determinations. In this context, the problem
of retroactivity is poorly addressed in Altmann. Ultimately, claims
concerning a foreign sovereign’s acts prior to 1952 cannot and should not
be determined by retroactive application of the FSIA.216 The Act not only
creates an impermissible retroactive effect, but it also does not cover every
potential legitimate claim, and its continued use in such instances interferes
with Executive authority in foreign affairs. Given the history of treaties and
initiatives addressing expropriation and restitution, it is clear that litigation
is neither the appropriate nor encouraged course of action. A more fitting
result would be if Maria Altmann and the last survivors seeking redress for
these crimes of the past were spared the emotional and financial costs of
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litigation through government efforts at securing a diplomatic resolution.
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